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THE ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM OF
PROSECUTORS IN DISCRETIONARY
DECISIONS
Ellen S. Podgor
INTRODUCTION
P ROSECUTORIAL discretion is a reality.' Its existence has been
consistently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.2
Although Congress has recently extended the application of ethical
rules to federal prosecutors, these rules do not directly supervise a
prosecutor's discretionary decisions.3 Further, discretionary decisions
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Visiting Scholar,
Yale Law School, Fall 1998. B.S., Syracuse University, 1973; J.D., Indiana University
School of Law at Indianapolis, 1976; M.B.A., University of Chicago, 1987; LLM.,
Temple University School of Law, 1989. The Author is appreciative of the helpful
comments received from Professors Marjorie Girth, Roy Sobelson, Rory K. Little,
and the Georgia State University College of Law faculty attending a presentation on
this Article. The Author wishes to also thank Jill Greenstein Polster for research
assistance in the writing of this Article. The Author is appreciative of Georgia State
University College of Law's financial support during the writing of this Article.
Although the opinions expressed in this Article are those of the Author, the
Author discloses that she is presently a co-chair of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers' Discovery Reform Committee. See William D. Douglas,
Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 227,232 (1965).
1 See Wayne R LaFave et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 13.2(a), at 10 (2d ed.
1999) ("The notion that the prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad range of
discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when not to is firmly entrenched in
American law."); see also Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 717, 718 (1996) (discussing increased power in prosecutors'
offices); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States:
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 Ohio
St. L.J. 1325, 1336-46 (1993) (comparing the prosecutorial discretion allowed
American prosecutors "with civil law counterparts"); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L Rev. 1521, 1523-37 (1981) (discussing
the breadth of prosecutorial discretion).
2. See, eg., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (explaining that
subject only to constitutional restraints, prosecutors retain broad discretion in
deciding whom to prosecute); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("[So
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
3. The recent passage of the McDade Amendment, included as part of the
Citizens Protection Act, subjects federal prosecutors to ethics rules. See Citizens
Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 101(b), 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.
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will seldom reach a level of being "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad
faith" to warrant a monetary award under the Hyde Amendment.'
The only real voice in the federal system that limits prosecutorial
discretion can be found in the guidelines of the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), internal mechanisms which are legally unenforceable by
defense counsel.6
Although it is important to discuss whether federal prosecutors
should be allowed this amount of discretion, this Article accepts the
existence of discretion, and leaves to another day a discussion of the
merits,7 or lack thereof,8 of having this level of power placed within
this executive body.9 This Article also omits discussion of what, if any,
2681, 2681-118 to -119) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B). Prosecutors may also be
subject to "ad hoc judicial rules." Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do
Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 75-
77 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors].
4. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997).
The immunity provided to prosecutors precludes most civil remedies against them.
See generally Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 3441 (1999) (discussing prosecutors' immunity in section 1983
actions).
5. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual (1999). See generally
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1971) (discussing the need for DOJ policy statements on the
exercise of discretion). Individual federal prosecutors do not have the discretion to
bring certain charges absent the review of higher authority within the DOJ. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-90.640 ("Prosecution of
violations which involve the exportation of property in which a foreign national or
foreign country has an interest shall not be undertaken without prior approval of the
Criminal Division"); id. § 9-2.136 ("No United States Attorney is to initiate a criminal
investigation, commence grand jury proceedings, file an information or complaint, or
seek the return of an indictment in matters involving overseas terrorism without the
express authorization of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.").
6. Courts have consistently noted that DOJ guidelines are merely internal
guidelines that cannot be enforced at law. See, e.g., United States v. Blackley, 167 F.3d
543, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding guidelines provide no enforceable rights);
United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 682 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding guideline in
money laundering case did not provide substantive rights to criminal defendant);
United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding guideline in
RICO case did not provide substantive or procedural rights to defendant). The DOJ
Guidelines contain, in many places, statements reminding that they are merely
internal guidelines. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual §
1-1.100 ("It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any
rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil
or criminal."); id. § 9-110.200 ("These guidelines provide only internal Department of
Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any
matter civil or criminal.").
7. See generally Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary
System, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 669, 673-76 (discussing the discretion afforded
prosecutors).
8. See Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 1560-72 (discussing various limits on
prosecutorial discretion).
9. Although admittedly I find fault in a structure that allows prosecutors to have
the existing breadth of discretion, I have not tackled this question in this Article. See
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limits should be placed upon existing prosecutorial discretion.
In examining how best to promote "minister of justice" t0 values in
the exercise of discretion, this Article presents a practical suggestion
for the status quo. The focus of this Article is on an ameliorative
method-education-as a means to providing a more ethical and
professional methodology in helping prosecutors navigate the
discretionary decision-making process.
This Article looks to four key prosecutorial decisions in the federal
system as examples of decisions that permit a wide breadth of
discretion, namely: the decision of what evidence to present to the
grand jury;1' the charging decision;n the decision of when to provide
witness statements,' and the decision to offer a defendant the
possibility of a reduced sentence under United States Sentencing
Guideline 5K1.1.14 Although these discretionary decisions represent
four different stages in the criminal process, they are by no means an
exhaustive list of the many decisions made by federal prosecutors'
In examining each of these decisions, it is obvious that discretionary
decision-making can produce varying results. Although some
variance is warranted to promote individual circumstances, decisions
that differ without any semblance of reason except for the fact that a
different Assistant United States Attorney handled the matter creates
distrust in the methodology used in making these decisions. The
laziness or aggressiveness of the prosecutor should not be the
controlling factor in how these decisions are made.
David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ.
509, 530-31 (1999) (discussing how scholars fail to address the question of how
prosecutors should exercise discretion).
10. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1999) ("A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate."); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L Rev. 45, 60-65 (1991) (discussing
the vagueness of the "do justice" standard).
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part I.D. Guideline section 5K1.1 permits a prosecutor to file a
motion for a sentence reduction when a defendant offers "substantial assistance." See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (1999).
15. Not reflected here are an array of important decisions made by prosecutors,
such as which witnesses will be called, whether to offer a plea, and whether to dismiss
charges. There are also other sentencing issues accruing from the enactment of the
federal sentencing guidelines that allow for prosecutorial discretion. See generally
Paul M. Secunda, Note, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing Uniformity:
Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1267 (1997) (noting as the "sources of
prosecutorial discretion under the guidelines:" "the charging decision," "plea
negotiation," "relevant conduct," and "substantial assistance motions").
Prosecutorial discretion also plays an integral role in forfeiture. See Laurie L
Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal
Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 553,564-65 (1999).
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Decisions that reflect high moral values and impart a "minister of
justice '16 consideration inspire a heightened respect for our judicial
system. This can be difficult to achieve because the very nature of
discretionary decisions makes achieving consistency problematic.
What appears to be the appropriate resolution may differ among
individuals. Prosecutors with the highest of ethical standards and
professional motivations may not agree on what is the best result for a
particular case.
Accepting that prosecutors, with the highest of motivations, can
reach varying results on discretionary decisions does not diminish the
fact that the existing system produces a certain inequity. Although
not always considered the ideal,17 uniformity in sentencing is
nonetheless promoted in the present federal sentencing structure. 8
More importantly, a widespread lack of uniformity with respect to
discretionary decision-making by prosecutors reduces the public's
perception that the legal system employs a fair and ethical process.' 9
A lack of uniformity is particularly problematic when it occurs
through actions of prosecutors, who unlike judges do not have an
exclusively neutral role in the criminal justice system. This Article,
however, recognizing that a myriad of factors encompassing the
decision-making process often warrants differing results for individual
cases, does not advocate for a strict uniform structure that would
control all decisions.20
The Article focuses on educating those making discretionary
decisions.21 It suggests that discussion of the discretionary decision-
making process be considered both in the law school setting2 and in
programs following law school.' Consideration needs to be given to
how conscious and unconscious bias may affect discretionary
decisions. Informed and consistent decisions will engender a better
system, one that is more respected by the public.
This discussion of the decision-making process should not be
16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process:
The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833 (1992) (noting
problems with uniformity in federal sentencing guidelines).
18. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Introduction at A.3 (1999) ("Congress
sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in
sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders."). It
has been questioned whether this uniformity has in fact been achieved. See generally
Michael Higgins, Sizing Up Sentences, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1999, at 42 (noting disparities
in white-collar sentences issued under the federal sentencing guidelines).
19. See infra Part II.
20. Although this author would prefer alternate solutions that would limit
prosecutorial discretion, this Article is limited to proposing a solution within the
existing structure.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 681514
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focused exclusively on ethical mandates. It is equally important to
consider issues of professionalism,24 promoting a higher standard than
adherence to minimum ethical rules.
It is also important that the rhetoric of leaders within each United
States Attorney's office express the importance of ethics and
professionalism. The key to changing the culture of an office is to
have federal prosecutors consider ethics and professionalism in
making all decisions.
I. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS
A. The Decision of What Evidence to Present to the Grand Jury
Prosecutors have enormous discretion in deciding what evidence to
present to a federal grand jury. Perhaps the strongest authorization of
complete discretion to federal prosecutors is set forth in United States
v. Williams,.' where the Supreme Court held that there is no
requirement for a federal prosecutor to present "substantial
exculpatory evidence" to a federal grand jury.'
The DOJ, recognizing the discretion allowed by the Williams case,
has attempted to limit the Court's holding through an internal
guideline. The guideline states that "when a prosecutor conducting a
grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which
directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the
prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the
grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person. '"27
Like all DOJ guidelines, however, this internal policy is not legally
enforceable by the accused.28 A defendant is not entitled to a
dismissal of his or her case when the prosecutor fails to abide by the
department policy. 9
24. Although professionalism has been the subject of many definitions, the basic
premises of this concept offer definition. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Lawyer
Professionalism in a Gendered Society, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 323 (1996) (discussing the
various definitions of professionalism).
25. 504 U.S. 36 (1992). See generally Fred A. Bernstein, Behind the Gray Door.
Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L Rev. 563 (1994)
(discussing the ramifications of the Williams case).
26. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 45-55. The government is required, however, to
release exculpatory evidence to a defendant. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86
(1963); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d) (1999).
27. U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-11.233 (1999).
28. See id. ("While a failure to follow the Department's policy should not result in
dismissal of an indictment, appellate courts may refer violations of the policy to the
Office of Professional Responsibility for review."); see also United States v. Gillespie,
974 F.2d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 1992) (failing to provide target warnings in contravention
of DOJ policy does not mandate the exercise of the court's supervisory powers).
29. See United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 80-83 (discussing the Office of
Professional Responsibility's review of the Isgro case).
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Prosecutors can have differing motivations for presenting
exculpatory matter to a federal grand jury. A prosecutor seeking
justice would clearly desire to present full information to the charging
body. Likewise, a prosecutor seeking convictions may find it
beneficial to present all information to a grand jury to avoid risking a
later trial that might result in an acquittal. The motivation of a
prosecutor in deciding whether to present exculpatory evidence to a
grand jury, however, is seldom relevant under law.
What in fact will be presented to a federal grand jury is left for the
most part to the individual Assistant United States Attorney handling
the grand jury.3" Failure to offer exculpatory evidence to a grand jury
presents a dilemma to the defense when a prosecutor requests a
waiver of any possible discovery violations in return for a plea
agreement. The accused individual risks the possibility of a
heightened sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines if he or
she decides to pursue full discovery.31 In this scenario the accused
cannot confirm whether exculpatory evidence exists. More
importantly, the accused does not even know if the indictment was
issued with full information being provided to the grand jury.
B. The Charging Decision
Prosecutors also have an enormous power in the charging
decision.32 Although this "discretion is broad, it is not 'unfettered."'33
Yet, absent a discriminatory intent and effect,' there are few avenues
available for the accused to review this prosecutorial discretion.35 The
30. Under certain circumstances, however, internal guidelines may restrict
whether an Assistant United States Attorney can bring a matter to a grand jury. See,
e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-2.136 ("No United States
Attorney is to initiate a criminal investigation, commence grand jury proceedings, file
an information or complaint, or seek the return of an indictment in matters involving
overseas terrorism without the express authorization of the Assistant Attorney
General of the Criminal Division.").
31. See generally Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the
Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
567 (1999) (discussing requests for discovery waivers as part of a plea agreement).
32. Prosecutors, now bound by ethical rules, may not prosecute "a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.8(a) (1999); see also Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal
Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 246, 256-77 (1980) (providing a quantitative study of prosecutorial discretion in
the prosecution and declination of cases); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective
Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful
Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309, 1328-42 (1997)
(discussing the rationales of prosecutorial discretion).
33. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)); see id. (noting that the prosecutorial decision to
charge cannot be made on an impermissible standard such as race or religion).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470-71 (1996) (finding that
defendant was not entitled to discovery claim for selective prosecution).
35. See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective
1516 [Vol. 68
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enormity of this power is seen not only in the decision of what to
charge, but also in whether to charge.-
The DOJ's "Principles of Federal Prosecution"' offer prosecutors
general considerations8 for making charging decisions.39 In not
providing guidance that is specific to a case, or at least to particular
statutes, consistency in the decision-making process is not achieved.o
Prosecutorial guidelines require that an Assistant United States
Attorney receive departmental approval prior to proceeding with
charges on some offenses41 or defendants.4 2 This is not, however, the
case with respect to most criminal charges or defendants. Further,
even when guidelines require special approval, there is little remedy
for the accused when a prosecutor fails to adhere to these rules.
The American Bar Association also offers guidance that can assist
prosecutors in their charging decisions. The ABA Standards of
Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 Am. Crim. L
Rev. 1071 (1997) (discussing how best to handle prosecutorial discretion after the
Armstrong case).
36. Defense counsel is seldom successful in proving a selective prosecution claim.
See Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Alive and Well,
and Living in Indiana?, 3 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 657, 659-61 (1990). One criterion that
may influence whether a prosecutor pursues criminal conduct is the ability to prove
the case in court. Evidence rules can influence this decision. See generally Daniel C.
Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?,
83 Va. L. Rev. 939 (1997) (discussing limitations on the nature of a prior felony
conviction per the Old Chief case). Prosecutors can also find that limited resources
will guide some of their decision-making. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L
Rev. 917,918 (1999).
37. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual §§ 9-27.001 to .750B (1999).
38. These principles have been designed to assist in structuring the decision-
making process of attorneys for the government. For the most part, they have been
cast in general terms with a view to providing guidance rather than to mandating
results. The intent is to assure regularity without regimentation and to prevent
unwarranted disparity without sacrificing necessary flexibility.
39. The Principles of Federal Prosecution recommend charging the "most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct." U.S. Dep't of
Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-27.310. Applying this standard can result in
different interpretations. What is meant by "consistent with the nature of the
defendant's conduct?" For example, should a prosecutor charge odometer tampering
or mail fraud when an individual is accused of rolling back odometers and the titles
are mailed to the state? See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 722 (1989)
(involving use of mail fraud as charge where the conduct involved odometer
tampering).
40. In defining the terms used in these principles, much is left "to the wisdom of
the prosecuting attorney." H. Richard Uviller, The Tilted Playing Field 70 (1999)
[hereinafter Uviller, The Tilted Playing Field] (discussing the benefits that accrue
from the process of using general guidelines).
41. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-110.101 (requiring
prior approval from the criminal division for RICO charges); see also id. § 9-2A00
(providing a prior approvals chart).
42. See, e.g., id. § 9-2.136(5) (requiring prior approval to prosecute crimes against
select U.S. officials).
43. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Criminal Justice provide general considerations for all prosecutors.44
These standards, however, do not consider specific issues that may
arise in the federal context.45
Prosecutorial decisions are given a "presumption of regularity. 4 6
Discretionary decisions by prosecutors are seldom subject to review in
higher courts.47 A district court may not usurp the discretion afforded
a prosecutor by eliminating charges unless there exists a proper legal
basis for dismissing them."8 As stated by Professor H. Richard Uviller,
"despite frequent challenge, prosecutors in fact enjoy broad license."49
This power is increased with the recent multiplication of federal
criminal statutes.5
The discretionary decisions of prosecutors can consciously or
unconsciously be affected by race bias.51 Yet allegations of improper
use of discretion premised upon racial bias are nearly impossible to
prove. Despite studies tending to show that prosecutors have
exhibited bias in some of their charging decisions,53 courts have been
44. See Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9, Discretion in the Charging
Decision (3d ed. 1993); see also H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest
of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1148-50
(1978) (explaining the purpose of Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9).
45. The American Law Institute also offers a general guideline for plea
discussions and agreements. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 350.3,
at 617 (1975) (establishing guidelines for plea discussions and agreements).
46. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)); see also id. ("'In the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged
their official duties."' (quoting Chemical Found., 272 U.S. at 14-15)).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the "unreviewability" of prosecutorial discretion).
48. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States v.
Zabawa, 39 F.3d 279, 284-85 (10th Cir. 1994).
49. Uviller, The Tilted Playing Field, supra note 40, at 49.
50. See ABA Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, The
Federalization of Criminal Law 2 (1998) ("[O]f all federal crimes enacted since 1865,
over forty percent have been created since 1970."); see also Sara Sun Beale, Too
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 Hastings L.J. 979, 980 (1995) ("[T]here are now more than
3,000 federal crimes.").
51. See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege
of Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13 (1998) (discussing how prosecutorial discretion
has had racial implications); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and
Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347
(1999) (discussing prosecutorial issues in the context of death penalty cases).
52. See Davis, supra note 51, at 38-40. A recent addition to the comments to Rule
8.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct include that "[a] lawyer who, in
the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are
prejudicial to the administration of justice." Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.4 cmt. 2 (1999).
53. See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 644-65 & nn.119-21 (1998).
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reluctant to scrutinize the prosecutorial decision-making process.
The prosecutor's discretionary power is magnified in the white
collar crime context, where the characterization of conduct as criminal
instead of tortious may be within the prosecutor's realm of decision-
making.5 Whether a prosecutor should pursue wrongful conduct in
an administrative arena or the criminal courts can also be a
prosecutorial decision. Internal limits for prosecution used in a
particular United States Attorney's Office may be the controlling
factor in some of these decisions. Offices might use different
threshold levels for proceeding with prosecutions.
The possibility of using generic statutes such as mail fraud55 and
conspiracy to defraud 56 increases the variability in the decision-making
processY For example, prosecutors can charge mail fraud for a wide
array of fraudulent conduct.-8 Despite particularized legislation,
courts usually permit the use of the generic mail fraud statute when
the prosecutor selects this statute as the charge.59 The legislative role
becomes less consequential when a myriad of different conduct can be
placed within this one criminal offense.
The prosecutorial decision to use a felony statute such as mail
fraud, when a misdemeanor statute more clearly describes the crime,
provides the opportunity for a prosecutor to use his or her power to
increase the possible sentence.60 Prosecutors may also have an impact
on the sentencing decision by adding charges such as RICO61 or
54. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the
Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J.
1875 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between that which is civil and
that which is criminal); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middlegroutd
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L.J 1795 (1992) (comparing punitive civil
sanctions with criminal sanctions). Prosecutors may also have the discretion to
choose whether to file civil or criminal contempt charges. See, e.g., United States v.
Doe, 125 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing the broad discretion
afforded prosecutors).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
56. See id. § 371. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud tie
United States, 68 Yale L.J. 405 (1959) (exploring the dynamics of conspiracy).
57. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 Am. U. L Rev. 729 (1999)
(discussing differences in generic and specific fraud statutes).
58. See generally Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud:
The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L Rev. 435 (1995)
(addressing interpretive issues considered by courts in determining scope of federal
jurisdiction over fraudulent schemes); Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters,
43 S.C. L. Rev. 223, 225 (1992) [hereinafter Podgor, Mail Fraud] (highlighting
"confusion and ambiguity" resulting from case law and statutory modifications of mail
fraud statute).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(permitting use of mail fraud charge despite the existence of specific Medicaid fraud
statute).
60. In Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), the prosecutor sought a
felony charge of mail fraud for rolled-back odometers, despite the existence at that
time of a misdemeanor offense of odometer tampering. See id. at 707-22.
61. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. Mail fraud is a commonly used predicate to a
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money laundering62 to a mail fraud charge. 63 Adding these charges, or
threatening to add these charges,' can stimulate an early plea
agreement. These prosecutorial decisions are permitted under law,65
yet clearly they place enormous power in the hands of individual
Assistant United States Attorneys.
C. The Decision of When to Provide Witness Statements
Witness statements can be valuable in representing the accused.
Although it appears that the law provides a uniform standard for
release of witness statements to the defense, federal prosecutors in
fact have enormous discretion in deciding when to turn this material
over to the defense.' Often such statements are not provided until
the eve of the trial, and technically need not be provided until after
the trial begins.
In Jencks v. United States,67 the Supreme Court provided that a
defendant in a criminal case is entitled, for impeachment purposes, to
the statements of government witnesses.' Although the Court did not
specify when these statements must be made available to the defense,
18 U.S.C. § 3500, commonly referred to as the Jencks Act, clarified
this issue. Under the Jencks Act, a statement must be provided no
RICO charge. The existence of two or more predicate acts within a specified time
often permits the addition of RICO as a separate charge. See Podgor, Mail Fraud,
supra note 58, at 263-64. RICO charges do require approval from the Criminal
Division. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-110.101.
62. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957; see also United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 753
(5th Cir. 1999) ("group[ing]" money laundering with mail and wire fraud charges
resulting in a lengthened sentence).
63. The classic mail fraud offense starts with an offense level of six under the
federal sentencing guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Fl.l(a)
(1999). If a charge under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO") is added then the guideline level becomes a base offense level of nineteen.
See id. § 2EL.1(a)(1). Money laundering would use a base offense level of either
twenty or twenty-three, depending on what provision the accused is charged under.
See id. § 2S1.1 (a).
64. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 18, at 44 ("Money laundering is also a frequent
tool in pre-indictment bargaining. Prosecutors may tell the target of an investigation
that if he agrees to plead guilty, the prosecutors will limit the indictment to mail
fraud .... (quoting David Rothman, criminal defense lawyer in Miami and then
president-elect of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)).
65. See United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998) ("The
Supreme Court has unambiguously upheld the prosecutor's ability to influence the
sentence through the charging decision.").
66. The timing of the release of the Jencks material is but one of the Jencks issues
that has proved controversial. There is continual discussion regarding issues such as
what constitutes a statement, whether it includes FBI reports, and whether the
statement is "substantially verbatim." Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks
Witness Statements: Timing Makes a Difference, 15 Ga. St. L. Rev. 651, 661-63 (1999)
[hereinafter Podgor, Criminal Discovery].
67. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
68. See id. at 672. See generally Podgor, Criminal Discovery, supra note 66
(discussing the role of prosecutorial discretion in the release of Jencks material).
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later than after the "witness has testified on direct examination in the
trial of the case."69  Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in addition to making this provision reciprocal, reiterates
that witnesses' statements are to be provided no later than after a
witness testifies." Rule 26.2 also extends the release of witness
statements to include certain hearings'
Although the statute and rule provide a standard that serves as the
last possible time limit for providing witness statements (Jencks
material) to the defense,72 in reality there is significant disparityr3 in
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994). Section 3500 reads:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made
by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than
the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to
which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall
order it to be delivered to the defendant for his examination and use.
Id § 3500.
70. See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 26.2(a). The rule states:
After a witness other than the defendant has testified on direct examination,
the court, on motion of a party who did not call the witness, shall order the
attorney for the government or the defendant and the defendant's attorney,
as the case may be, to produce, for the examination and use of the moving
party, any statement of the witness that is in their possession and that relates
to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified.
Id.
71. See id. Rule 26.2(g). The rule states:
This rule applies at a suppression hearing conducted under Rule 12, at trial
under this rule, and to the extent specified:
(1) in Rule 32(c)(2) at sentencing;
(2) in Rule 32.1(c) at a hearing to revoke or modify probation or supervised
release;
(3) in Rule 46(i) at a detention hearing;
(4) in Rule 8 of the Rule Governing Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255;
and
(5) in Rule 5.1 at a preliminary examination.
Id.
72. Although federal prosecutors are required to submit exculpatory material to
the defense, it remains unclear whether the holding of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), trumps the time limits offered in the Jencks Act. See United States v. Snell,
899 F. Supp. 17, 21 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding it "inconceivable that a statutory
obligation should supersede a constitutional one"). But see United States v. Scott, 524
F.2d 465,467-68 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Brady is not a pretrial remedy and was not intended
to override the mandate of the Jencks Act."); see also Podgor, Criminal Discovery,
supra note 66, at 673-78 (discussing the interplay between Brady and Jencks).
73. The Jencks Act time limits have been termed "utterly impractical," thus
accounting for its being "routinely ignored." United States v. Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76,
78 (D. Mass. 1996). For a full discussion as to problems with the time restrictions
outlined in the Jencks Act, see Podgor, Criminal Discovery, supra note 66, at 692-700.
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when defense counsel actually receives these statements. 74  For
example, some federal prosecutors routinely provide witness
statements "ten days before trial."75 Other Assistant United States
Attorneys use "Friday before trial" as the standard for the release of
these statements.76 Other federal prosecutors, however, refuse to
release these statements until after the witness has testified.77
Absent office policy, individual prosecutors are left to decide when
Jencks material will be provided to defense counsel. s Some defense
attorneys are fortunate to practice in jurisdictions that have "open-
file" discovery practices and thus receive the material early in the
case. Other criminal defense attorneys are forced to prepare their
cases under severe time constraints because they must wait until after
the witness has testified on direct examination to receive these
statements.79  Although courts often "encourage" early release of
Jencks material, reported appellate decisions reflect that they are
seldom successful in mandating the release of these statements prior
to the witness's testifying.8"
Prosecutors clearly need to protect the safety of their witnesses.8' A
later release of Jencks material, however, is often not a reflection of
this meritorious goal. Criminal defense attorneys claim that federal
prosecutors can be influenced by factors such as whether the
74. See generally Podgor, Criminal Discovery, supra note 66, at 678-92 (discussing
a study of the varying times at which defense practitioners receive Jencks material).
75. See id. at 682.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 681-82. Seventy-nine percent of the attorneys responding to the
survey conducted by this Author in the aforementioned article stated that they
believed "the timing for receipt of Jencks material varied by Assistant United States
Attorney." Id. at 686. This same survey also found that "approximately sixty percent
of [criminal defense] attorneys believed that there was no set policy in their
jurisdiction" as to when Jencks material is given to defense counsel. Id. at 688.
79. See id. at 692-701 (discussing the rationale for modifying the present time
constraints in receiving Jencks material).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Algie, 667 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1982) (court cannot
require prosecutors to produce Jencks material in advance of the mandates in the
statute); United States v. Spagnuolo, 515 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1975) (court cannot
compel early disclosure of Jencks material); United States v. Mariani, 7 F. Supp. 2d
556, 564 (M.D. Pa. 1998) ("[C]ourt cannot require early production of Jencks
material."). Courts have been able to achieve early disclosure for the defense by
finding prosecution agreements to discovery time limits binding. See, e.g., United
States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 86 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding that the government is
required to turn over Jencks material before trial because it had previously agreed to
turn this material over early). Courts have also used "case management" as a basis
for requiring the early disclosure of Jencks material. See, e.g., United States v. Snell,
899 F. Supp. 17, 24 (D. Mass. 1995) (showing the court's use of "case management
basis" to order early disclosure of witness statements).
81. See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1285 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting the
need to protect "potential government witnesses from threats of harm or other
intimidation").
[Vol. 681522
2000] DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS OF PROSECUTORS 1523
prosecutor is anxious to obtain a plea agreement from the defendant.n
When a statement is provided to defense counsel only after the
witness has testified at trial, the prosecution is provided with a trial
advantage.' In contrast, defense counsel is deprived of the
opportunity to coordinate a consistent trial strategy when he or she
receives witness statements only after the witness has testified.
There are obviously many alternatives that could reduce
prosecutorial discretion with regard to when Jencks material is
received by defense counsel.' A modification of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and
Rule 26.2, coupled with legislative action that places the burden on
the federal prosecutor to demonstrate why a witness statement should
not be immediately released, could replace existing prosecutorial
discretion with judicial oversight., Absent modification of the
existing statute and rule, however, prosecutors will continue to
exercise their discretion in deciding when witness statements will be
released to defense counsel.
D. The Decision to Offer a Defendant the Possibility of Sentencing
Under 5KJ.1
Prosecutors have the exclusive authority to offer a defendant the
possibility of a sentence reduction pursuant to section 5K1.1 of the
federal sentencing guidelinesY Prosecutors file such a motion in cases
82. See Podgor, Criminal Discovery, supra note 66, at 687.
83. See id. at 697. There has been criticism of the disadvantage in which defense
attorneys are placed in the discovery process. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, The
State and the Accused. Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale Li. 1149
passim (1960) (discussing disadvantages faced by the defense in criminal procedure).
84. See Podgor, Criminal Discovery, supra note 66, at 697; see also United States
v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380,390 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[D]elayed disclosures diverted defense
counsels' attention 'from the tasks of defending to the task of preparing.'").
85. Congress could require all witness statements to be immediately submitted to
defense counsel. Considering the current crime control posture of the legislature, this
possibility is highly unlikely.
86. See Podgor, Criminal Discovery, supra note 66, at 701-05.
87. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (1999). The guideline reads:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons
stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the
following:(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's
evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Id. There has been criticism of the 5K1.1 motion calling for elimination of the
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where a defendant offers "substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.""8
Unlike many of the other sentence reductions under the federal
sentencing guidelines, this reduction allows for a defendant to be
sentenced outside the guidelines. Although a court determines the
appropriate reduction, 9 the sole authority for initiating this discussion
rests with the prosecutor.90
The use of a section 5K1.1 motion by federal prosecutors has
received criticism in part because differing results can be reached
depending on the individual prosecutor or particular United States
Attorneys' Office.91  Professor Cynthia Lee notes that
government motion requirement. See generally Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Sentencing
Court's Discretion to Depart Downward in Recognition of a Defendant's Substantial
Assistance: A Proposal to Eliminate the Government Motion Requirement, 23 Ind. L.
Rev. 681 (1990) (discussing the benefits of eliminating the requirement that the
government move for sentence reduction pursuant to section 5K1.1); Philip T.
Masterson, Comment, Eliminating the Government Motion Requirement of Section
5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-A Substantial Response to Substantial
Assistance: United States v. Gutierrez, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 929 (1991) (arguing for
elimination of the government motion requirement for a sentence reduction pursuant
to 5K1.1). At one point, the sentencing commission circulated a proposal that would
remove the government motion requirement for a section 5K1.1 reduction. See John
S. Austin, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion and Substantial Assistance: The Power and
Authority of Judicial Review-United States v. Wade, 15 Cambell L. Rev. 263, 292
n.195 (1993).
88. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1.
89. See supra note 87 for the factors to be considered in assessing the sentence of
the defendant. Courts also have the discretion to deny a 5K1.1 motion filed by the
prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting
courts' discretion to grant or deny substantial assistance motion); United States v.
Franks, 46 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to grant a 5K1.1 motion based upon
defendant's conduct).
90. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1696-98(1992) (discussing limitation in a judge's sentencing discretion). A sentencing
departure for the defendant differs from an "acceptance of responsibility" reduction,
in that it is "directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities by
persons other than the defendant." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5Kl.1
commentary at 2. In contrast, an acceptance of responsibility reduction, which can be
initiated by a judge, is provided when there is a showing of the "defendant's
affirmative recognition of responsibility for his [or her] own conduct." Id.
91. The section 5K1.1 motion has also been criticized for not considering
situations where a defendant has no information to offer. This can occur where the
defendant is a sole actor involved in criminality or when all individuals participating
in the criminality have previously obtained their plea agreement and the defendant's
information offers nothing new to the investigation. See Avern Cohn, The Unfairness
of 'Substantial Assistance,' 78 Judicature 186, 186 (1995) (discussing many of the
reasons that a defendant may not be able to offer substantial assistance, including that
"[t]he defendant may honestly believe he or she is not guilty and will be acquitted").
Professor Cynthia K.Y. Lee also notes that "[a]llowing a downward departure for
defendants who cooperate also raises questions about the wisdom of rewarding
culpable offenders who 'snitch' on others." Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to
Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial
Assistance Departures, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 199, 209 (1997) [hereinafter Lee, From
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"[d]isparity... may result even under well-intentioned internal
guidelines when they are not applied uniformly."9'
Courts have not provided relief for the disparity accruing from this
discretionary decision-making process. In Wade v. United States,' the
Supreme Court held that absent an impermissible basis for not filing a
section 5K1.1 motion, such as race or religion, a court does not have
the authority to depart." The Court further solidified prosecutorial
power in Melendez v. United States95 by holding that a government
motion pursuant to 5K1.1 does not authorize a court to depart below
the statutory minimum unless the government specifically requests
this departure.96 Courts routinely reject defense arguments that the
government's refusal to file a section 5K1.1 motion was improper. 7
There have been calls for modifications that would reduce
prosecutorial discretion, including suggestions that would deny the
prosecutor the sole voice in initiating the substantial assistance
motion.98  Recently, Professor Cynthia Lee discussed the
implementation of nationwide guidelines that would offer
prosecutorial guidance in making these discretionary decisions.9 It
has also been argued that an ethics rule is needed to provide a system
that will limit prosecutorial discretion that has expanded as a result of
the federal sentencing guidelines. 1
II. UNMONITORED DISCRETION
The four examples provided in Part I demonstrate the breadth of
power placed with prosecutors. The discretion allowed prosecutors is
not limited to the initial phases of a prosecution. Rather,
prosecutorial discretion can occur throughout a defendant's case.
Gatekeeper to Concierge]. There has also been criticism regarding how prosecutors
assess the individuals being offered cooperation agreements. See generally
Yaroshefsky, supra note 36 (discussing cooperation and the reliability of cooperator
testimony).
92. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 105, 122 (1994).
93. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
94. See id. at 186.
95. 518 U.S. 120 (1996).
96. See id. at 128-29.
97. See generally Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge, supra note 91 (arguing for
guidelines on the granting of substantial assistance). There are, however, several
courts that have allowed the court some review of the substantial assistance motion.
See, e.g., United States v. Khoury, 62 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
court could consider substantial assistance despite withdrawal of motion by
prosecutors); United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that
the defendant should be given the opportunity to show that the government's reasons
for not filing a section 5K1.1 motion are due to prosecutorial vindictiveness).
98. See supra note 87.
99. See Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge, supra note 91, at 245-51.
100. See Secunda, supra note 15, at 1286-91 (proposing that the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct be used to curb prosecutorial discretion).
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Prosecutorial discretion can be active despite the existence of
statutory authority, as in the Jencks Act. It also is exhibited when
applying the federal sentencing guidelines, despite the fact that the
guidelines were enacted to promote uniformity and reduce discretion.
This discretionary power held by federal prosecutors is for the most
part unmonitored.11 Their discretionary decisions seldom reach a
level subject to the ethical standards now mandated by the McDade
Amendment.'0 Further, even the internal mechanisms within the
DOJ do not sufficiently address the discretionary decision-making
process. Although the National District Attorneys' Association,1" the
American Bar Association,"° the American Law Institute,05 and the
Justice Department's United States Attorneys' Manual'06 provide
policy statements that can guide prosecutors in some discretionary
decisions, for the most part prosecutors receive limited education on
the processes to be used in discretionary decisions." Professor
101. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 224
(1969) ("The enormous and much abused power of prosecutors not to prosecute is
almost completely uncontrolled . . ... "); Frase, supra note 32, at 303 ("This study
reveals that the prosecutorial discretion of the U.S. Attorney is vast and unchecked by
any formal, external constraints or regulatory mechanisms."). Recently, the DOJ
requested that each U.S. Attorney's office appoint an ethics officer ("Professional
Responsibility Officer"). See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for
Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 723, 763-69 (1999)
[hereinafter Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept]; Professional Responsibility
Advisory Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Experienced Attorneys GS-13 to GS-15, para. 2
(visited Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/careers/oapmi/jobs/praofinalannounce-
ment.htm>.
102. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a) (West Supp. 1999); supra note 3. Unlike the
judiciary, prosecutors are not held to an appearance-of-impropriety standard in
reviewing their decisions. See Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get:
Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. Rev. 699,
722-25 (1998).
103. See National District Attorneys Association, Screening of Criminal Cases 8
(1973), cited in David C. James, The Prosecutor's Discretionary Screening and
Charging Authority, Prosecutor, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 22, 29 (1995).
104. See Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 3-2.5 (3d ed. 1993). Standard 3-
2.5 provides for a prosecutor's office to establish "a statement of (i) general policies to
guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and (ii) procedures of the office." Id.
This standard notes that "[t]he objectives of these policies as to discretion and
procedures should be to achieve a fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of the
criminal law." Id. Even if United States Attorneys' Offices were to have policies that
addressed all discretionary decisions, it would be necessary to have a coordinated
effort with other offices to achieve nationwide uniformity.
105. See, e.g., Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 350.3 (1975)
(discussing guidelines for plea discussions and agreements).
106. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-27.400 (1999)
(providing guidelines for entering into plea agreements); id. § 9-2.136 (providing
guidelines for investigative and prosecutorial policy for international terrorism
matters).
107. See James, supra note 103, at 22 ("[P]rosecutorial discretion is not the focus of
much training within prosecution offices."). But see Little, Proportionality as an
Ethical Precept, supra note 101, at 768-69 (discussing the relatively new ethics
program in the DOJ); see also infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (discussing
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Bennett L. Greshman has vocalized the "[a]bsence of [m]eaningful
[s]tandards to [g]uide [p]rosecutorial [d]iscretion. 'Iln
The Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR") is designated as
the internal monitor of ethical violations committed by federal
prosecutors.'09 In this role OPR focuses on professional misconduct." 0
Although the OPR examines alleged abuses of prosecutorial
authority, the conduct scrutinized usually relates to misconduct as
opposed to the considerations that might be prevalent in the
discretionary decision-making process.
In past years, the OPR has been criticized for failing to hold
prosecutors "publicly accountable for misdeeds." '' In 1993, a new
policy was implemented to include OPR reporting of certain
investigations."' Of the "121 attorney matters closed during the fiscal
year" 1997, "OPR found that [DOJ] attorneys engaged in professional
misconduct in 20, or about 16.5% .'113
OPR typically investigates the role of the prosecutor in cases
involving allegations such as "[a]buse of prosecutorial or investigative
authority,"'1 4  "[m]isrepresentation to the court or opposing
the functions of the recently created Professional Responsibility Office within the
DOJ).
108. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L Rev. 393, 43543
(1992).
109. See Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR's Annual
Report for the Fiscal Year 1997, Introduction (last modified Apr. 14, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/ 97annual.htm> ("In an order dated December 9, 1975, the
Attorney General created the OPR for the purpose of ensuring that '[d]epartmental
employees continue to perform their duties in accord with the professional standards
expected of the Nation's principal law enforcement agency."'); see also Green,
Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 84-87 (discussing the DOJ's OPR).
110. See Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR's Annual
Report for the Fiscal Year 1997 (last modified Apr. 14, 1999) <http'J/www.
usdoj.gov/opr/97annual.htm> ("The jurisdiction of the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) extends to the investigation of allegations of professional
misconduct by Department of Justice attorneys that relate to the exercise of their
authority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice."); see also U.S. Dep't of
Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 1-2.114 ("The Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility which reports directly to the Attorney General, is responsible for
overseeing investigations of allegations of criminal and ethical misconduct by the
Department's attorneys and criminal investigators.").
111. Jim McGee, Prosecutor Oversight Is Often Hidden from Sight, Wash. Post,
Jan. 15, 1993, at Al ("Critics say OPR and the Justice Department not only have
failed to set clear standards for prosecutors and investigators, but have failed to hold
them publicly accountable for misdeeds when it is determined they have occurred.");
see OPR Only Part of the Problem, Experts Say, DOJ Alert, Jan. 3-17, 1994, at 34
("The February 1992 [General Accounting Office] study concluded that OPR was
understaffed, highly informal in its operation and disorganized in its investigations.").
112. See Office of Prof'l Responsibility. U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR's Annual
Report for the Fiscal Year 1997 (last modified Apr. 14, 1999)
<http:/wvw.usdoj.gov/opr/97annual. htm>.
113. Id. These numbers reflect an increase in the number findings of professional
misconduct on the part of DOJ attorneys. See id.
114. Id. at tbl. 2. In 1997, this subject matter provided 32% of the complaints
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counsel," 115 "[u]nauthorized release of information (including grandjury information), ' 11 6 "[i]mproper oral or written remarks to the court
or grand jury,"'17 and "[c]onflicts of interest.""' 8 For example, the
1997 OPR Report includes an investigation resulting from the
government's dismissal of a case where a "U.S. Magistrate Judge
found over twenty separate Brady, Giglio, and Jencks Act violations
relating to the government's failure to disclose information about its
witnesses in a drug prosecution." ' 9 The OPR found that "the
discovery violations were not intentional or designed to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, but rather stemmed from mistakes and
carelessness."'20 The OPR's investigation concluded that the DOJ
attorney engaged in "professional misconduct," and the "DOJ
attorney received a written reprimand.' 2'
Instances of the OPR's examining possible discretionary decisions
are seen only from the perspective of whether misconduct has
occurred. For example, the 1997 OPR Report refers to a complaint
relating to a "substantial assistance" motion. According to this 1997
report, a "U.S. District Court found that a DOJ attorney acted in bad
faith by refusing to file a substantial assistance motion on behalf of a
defendant who had entered into a plea agreement with the
government."'" The OPR found that the attorney had not engaged in
misconduct because there were "valid reasons for not filing a
received by the OPR. See id. In 1996, this subject matter also provided the highest
number of complaints, although it reflected 28% of the total number of complaints
received by the OPR. See Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR
Annual Reports: 1996, tbl. 2 (last modified Jan. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/96annual.htm>.
115. Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR's Annual Reportfor
Fiscal Year 1997, tbl. 2 (last modified Apr. 14, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/97annual. htm>. In 1997, this subject matter provided
16% of the complaints received by the OPR. See id.
116. Id. In 1997, this subject matter provided 10% of the complaints received by
the OPR. See id.
117. Id. In 1997, this subject matter provided 10% of the complaints received by
the OPR. See id.
11& Id. In 1997, this subject matter provided 9% of the complaints received by the
OPR. See id. The variety of conduct scrutinized by the OPR is seen by examining the
numerous examples provided in each of the OPR reports. For example, in 1994 one
finds as examples instances such as alleged improper use of frequent flyer miles and
F'S lines for personal calls. See Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
OPR Annual Reports: 1994 (last modified Jan. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/94annual.htm>; see also Office of Prof'l Responsibility,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR Annual Reports: 1995 (last modified Jan. 30, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/95annual.htm> (listing such examples as "[t]hreatening
[ciriminal [p]rosecution to [c]oerce [slettlement of a [c]ivil [c]ase").
119. Office of Prof'I Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR's Annual Report for
Fiscal Year 1997 (last modified Apr. 14, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/97annual.htm>.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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substantial assistance motion."' " Although a discretionary decision
by a prosecutor was being examined in this case, the OPR
investigation focused on whether misconduct occurred and whether
the DOJ attorney had failed to honor a plea agreement.
The 1996 OPR Report also includes an investigation concerning
two DOJ attorneys who failed to "renew a substantial assistance
motion after the defendant withdrew his guilty plea and proceeded to
trial." 4 This investigation also resulted from a court's criticism of the
conduct of the DOJ attorneys. Disagreeing "with the court's finding
that the DOJ attorneys' real motive in refusing to renew the
substantial assistance motion was to retaliate against the defendant for
exercising his right to a jury trial," the OPR found that the attorneys
had not engaged in misconduct.'2
In rare instances, courts have taken it upon themselves to
reprimand prosecutors.' 21 For example, in United States v. Grosslzr a
district court decided not to forward a violation of DOJ policy to the
OPR. In Gross, the Assistant United States Attorney failed to follow
the DOJ guideline that would allow the accused to personally appear
before the grand jury to present exculpatory material. Deciding that
this was a first violation, the court sent its findings to "supervisors at
the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Central District of California."'t
In addition to the OPR, the DOJ also maintains a Departmental
Ethics Office. This office "is responsible for administering the
Department-wide ethics program and for implementing Department-
wide policies on ethics issues."' 29 The office, however, focuses on
ethics laws and regulations. It considers issues such as conflicts,
"[i]mpartiality in [p]erforming [o]fficial [d]uties," outside
employment, and "[p]ost-employment [r]estrictions."' -  The ethics
123. Id. The OPR report stated:
The DOJ attorney concluded that the defendant's cooperation had not
provided a tangible benefit to the government in that the evidence the
defendant was able to provide was insufficient to support the arrest or
indictment of any other person. Accordingly, the DOJ attorney determined,
with the express approval of his supervisors, that the defendant had not
provided substantial assistance.
Id.
124. Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR Annual Reports:
1996 (last modified Jan. 30, 1998) <http://wvv.usdoj.govlopr/96annual.htm>.
125. Id.
126. See Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 81 n.68.
127. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
128. Id. at 1100. The court stated, "[i]f this Court learns of future violations, the
U.S. Attorney's Office is on notice that this Court will not hesitate to make future
referrals to the Office of Professional Responsibility for review." Id.
129. Departmental Ethics Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Departmental Ethics Office,
para. 2 (last modified Nov. 1, 1999) <httpJ/vwv.usdoj.gov/jmd/ethicsI>.
130. See Departmental Ethics Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Departmental Ethics
Office General Authorities and Resources, pts. II.C, VH (last modified Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www. usdoj.gov/jmd/ethics/generalb.htn>.
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outline of this department as well as its handbook do not focus on the
discretionary decisions made by federal prosecutors.
Recently, the DOJ started a Professional Responsibility Advisory
Office. This office "is responsible for providing advice and guidance
to Department of Justice Attorneys on state, federal, and local rules
of professional conduct." '131 The office will also assist in disciplinary
actions resulting from the recent application of ethics rules to federal
prosecutors.132  In addition to ethics training programs, new
developments require that each United States Attorney's office have
"at least one professional responsibility officer. ' 133
III. EDUCATION
Many commentators have reflected on how best to improve the
ways that prosecutors handle discretionary decisions. There have
been suggestions of increasing the number and variety of internal
guidelines to monitor prosecutors' discretion."' For example,
Professor Norman Abrams reflects at length on the use of internal
guidelines to assist in achieving what he terms a "tolerable
consistency" in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 135  Professor
James Vorenberg, noting the necessity of holding prosecutors
"accountable for their decisions, ' 136 offers a comprehensive formula
including guidelines' 37 "[s]creening [c]onferences,"' 38 development of
a record-keeping system of the discretionary decisions made by
prosecutors, 39 legislative oversight, 40 and a strong judicial role.4'
131. Professional Responsibility Advisory Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Experienced Attorneys GS-13 to GS-15, para. 2 (visited Jan. 23, 2000)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/careers/oapm/jobs/praofinalannouncement.htm>; see also
Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept, supra note 101, at 768 (discussing the
DOJ's ethics program).
132. See Professional Responsibility Advisory Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Experienced Attorneys GS-13 to GS-15, para. 2 (visited Jan. 23, 2000)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/careers/ oapm/jobs/praofinalannouncement.htm>.
133. Attorney General Janet Reno, Press Conference (June 18, 1998), in U.S.
Department of Justice, Press Conference: The Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney
General, para. 9 (visited Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/aglspeeches/1998/
jun1898.htm>.
134. See Higgins, supra note 18, at 47 ("[Marcia] Shein suggests there could be a
policy regarding how U.S. attorneys make decisions on topics such as when to credit
substantial assistance or when to charge money laundering."). Professor Rory Little
advocates for a new ethics rule for prosecutors to guide them in the investigative
stage. See Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept, supra note 101, at 769.
135. Abrams, supra note 5, at 57.
136. Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 1562.
137. See id. at 1562-65.
138. Id. at 1565 ("One way of increasing the likelihood that prosecutors will
exercise their discretion fairly is to provide a formal procedural setting for discussions
concerning charge and disposition.").
139. See id. at 1565-66.
140. See id. at 1566-68. Professor Vorenberg includes code revision as part of this
discussion. See id.
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Professor Tracey L. Meares reflects on the use of financial rewards
"to shape a public prosecutor's behavior in desired ways."',
Professor Rory Little calls for an ethics rule to promote
"[p]roportionality in [i]nvestigation.' 43
The reality is that despite the suggestions of many and the
implementation of some of these suggestions, unmonitored
prosecutorial discretion remains. As a result of federal sentencing
guidelines, prosecutors have increased their discretionary powerY"
Internal guidelines have been disregarded with no legal enforcement
mechanism to monitor the violations.4 ' Additionally, although the
conduct may be subject to scrutiny by the OPR, this rarely results in
disciplinary action.Y The attempt to limit discretion has not
succeeded. 147
As opposed to proposing limitations to prosecutorial discretion,
offering internal guidelines, or calling for legislative action, all of
which may be warranted, this Article suggests an educational
approach to modifying how prosecutors use their discretion.
Heightening federal prosecutors' awareness of how best to achieve a
more ethical and professional system requires that prosecutors
understand the ramifications and appearance of inequity resulting
from inconsistency and abuse in the discretionary decision-making
process.
141. See id. at 1568-72.
142. Tracey L. Meares, Reivards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 Fordham L Rev. 851,917 (1995);
see also Robert L. Misner, supra note 1, at 766-67 (discussing having state prosecutor
discretion tied "to the availability of prison resources").
143. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept, supra note 101, at 752-53.
144. See United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards,
J., concurring). Judge Edwards wrote:
I address the gamesmanship of the Guidelines and the problematic roles of
the AUSAs and Probation Officers only to emphasize that the Guidelines
have not eliminated sentencing discretion. Rather, they have merely
transferred it from district judges-who, whatever their perceived failings,
are at least impartial arbiters who make their decisions on the record and
subject to public scrutiny and appellate review-to less neutral parties who
rarely are called to account for the discretion they wield. Thus, the
discretion and disparity game continues; it is only the players who have
changed.
Id. (footnote omitted).
145. See supra note 6.
146. See, eg., Office of Prof'l Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OPR's Annual
Report for Fiscal Year 1997 (last modified Apr. 14, 1999) <http'.iwwwv.usdoj.gov/oprl
97annual.htm> ("OPR also found that the DOJ attorney's comments to the reporter
controverted DOJ press policy, but that it did not rise to the level of professional
misconduct.").
147. Professor William Pizzi, using a comparative approach, shows -why attempts
to limit prosecutorial discretion on the European model are unlikely to work in this
country." Pizzi, supra note 1, at 1372.
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A. Law School
Law schools can start the process of education by using a
"contextual"' 4 or "pervasive" '149 method of teaching ethics in
conjunction with a specific application. Future prosecutors may be
graduating from law school without learning the intricacies of
discretionary decision-making. Although issues of selective
prosecution, vindictive prosecution, and prosecutorial misconduct
enter criminal procedure classes, these discussions often focus on the
legal issues. Understanding a case such as United States v. Williams5 '
requires going beyond a discussion of the policy considerations in the
Supreme Court's finding that prosecutors are not required to present
evidence to a grand jury that is exculpatory to the accused. 5 ' The
discussion also needs to focus on the ethics and professionalism of a
prosecutor who chooses not to present this evidence.
Attention in law school classes needs to be spent on bias within the
criminal justice system. Students need to be attuned to unconscious
racism to assure that the charging process is free of improper
influences. Law students need to realize the responsibility placed
upon prosecutors as a result of prosecutors' conduct having a
presumption of propriety.152
Likewise, discussion of the Jencks Act should emphasize that
compliance with minimum standards does not always comport with
the high standards attributed to professionalism. Students need to be
made aware that most Assistant United States Attorneys provide
Jencks material in advance of the requirements of the statute. Unless
one has a proper justification for not providing this material early,
such as witness protection, it is the "right thing to do."
148. See generally Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context,
39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 357, 359 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Teaching Ethics in a
Legal Context] (proposing a contextual course in professional responsibility rather
than a survey course).
149. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of
Professional Schools: Pervasive Ethics in Perspective, Teaching and Learning
Professionalism: Symposium Proceedings 25 (Sponsored by the ABA Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Professionalism Committee and the
Standing Committees on Professionalism and Lawyer Competence of the ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility) (1997) (arguing for translation of moral
principals into educational priorities); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive
Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31, 50 (1992) ("Contemporary justifications for the
pervasive method generally assume that it should serve not as a substitute for, but as a
supplement to separate coursework specifically focused on ethics. Only such an
integrated approach can convey the range and importance of the moral dimensions of
professional practice."); Andrew E. Taslitz, Essay, Exorcising Langdell's Ghost:
Structuring a Criminal Procedure Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think, 43
Hastings L.J. 143, 170-73 (1991) (discussing a pervasive study of ethics that "include[s]
a consideration of what is right, just, and fair").
150. 504 U.S. 36 (1992). See supra Part I.A.
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996).
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Discussions regarding punishment and the role of the prosecutor in
advocating for a particular sentence could include the considerations a
prosecutor might use in filing a section 5K1.1 motion. Questions with
regard to discretion can be explored here. For example, what should
a prosecutor do when an accused, although cooperative, has no
information to offer to assist a government investigation?
Classes in professional responsibility should include discussions
beyond the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Some ethics
courses are taught "contextually" and focus on issues of prosecutorial
discretion, 3  but do these professional responsibility classes
sufficiently prepare a future prosecutor to decide whether money
laundering is an appropriate addition to a mail fraud charge in a
particular case?
Internships and externships offer practical experiences and thus
provide another avenue to consider discretionary decision-making.
The array of discretionary decisions, however, cannot be left to
reviewing general principles of discretion. Specific applications need
to also be considered.
Law school graduates with high moral values, an understanding of
ethical issues, and a concern for professionalism may nonetheless
remain clueless regarding how best to apply these values in practice.
Incorporating ethics and professionalism concerns into criminal law
and criminal procedure class discussions can set the stage for a
heightened awareness of the issues faced in the world of prosecution.
Understanding the policy considerations in these decisions will
certainly benefit those proceeding to criminal defense legal positions.
Detailed coverage of discretionary decisions with all its applications
would certainly provide a better educated practitioner. The study of
discretionary decision-making to this specificity within law school
classes is, however, unrealistic.
B. Practice
Obviously, law schools cannot be the sole educators on how best to
resolve the ethical problems of discretionary decision-making. The
DOJ must also take a lead in providing federal prosecutors with
programs that focus on the decision-making process. For example,
programs should be implemented to consider conscious and
unconscious biases in charging decisionsY4
153. Some schools may have instituted separate courses that focus on ethics in
criminal advocacy. For example, Professor Bruce Green notes that the course at
Fordham University School of Law includes discussion of "prosecutorial discretion."
Green, Teaching Ethics in a Legal Context, supra note 148, at 373-74.
154. Some of the gender bias reports speak to educating on issues of bias. See, e.g.,
Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L Rev. 485, 622
(1993) ("Educational programs are needed to inform and educate the judiciary,
prosecutors, and police about how sexual stereotypes may taint the handling of sexual
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Respect for fairness in the judicial system is decreased when
lawyers see a prosecutor from one office providing Jencks material ten
days before trial, while a prosecutor from another office, handling a
similar type of case, offers the witness statements only after the
witness has testified. Disseminating information of the practices used
in other offices could assist in promoting consistency. Discussions of
existing guidelines and the considerations that play a part in making
these decisions can prove helpful in educating federal prosecutors.
Better coordination among the various United States Attorneys'
offices offers increased awareness of the practice. For example, there
needs to be an increased nationwide discussion on some of the
following questions to fully understand the implications of
prosecutorial discretion in sentencing. What has been the experience
of offices that use screening committees to make section 5Kl.1
decisions? Have formal office policies with respect to section 5Kl.1
been successful in presenting a consistent approach to prosecutorial
decisions? 5 5 A nationwide accepted practice could result from open
discussions of these questions.
The educational process cannot rest with a single continuing legal
education program. The fluid nature of laws in society, new crimes,
and new approaches to handling criminality require that these
discussions be a continual part of educating federal prosecutors.
Through education, federal prosecutors can understand the
ramifications that result to the legal profession when those with power
fail to use caution in the exercise of that power.
CONCLUSION
As with any profession, there are individuals who have high ethical
standards and others who through either laziness, inexperience, or
personal motivations, take a different road. The ethical standards of a
particular prosecutor can influence the outcome of discretionary
decisions.'56 In addition to ethical values, discretionary decisions can
be affected by the professionalism of the prosecutor handling the case.
The discretionary decision-making process may also be inspired by the
culture of a particular United States Attorneys' Office and the
rhetoric from the upper echelon of that office.
It certainly would be beneficial to have guidelines that reduce
discretion. It would likewise be an enhancement to have specific
statutes that did not permit prosecutors to legislate.1 57 As we await
assault and rape cases.").
155. See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1121, 1188-89 (1998) (discussing how prosecutors' offices need binding theories of
plea bargaining).
156. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 19 passim (1997).
157. Cf Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
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these structural changes, it seems appropriate to improve the
discretionary decision-making process through education.
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757,759-60 (1999) (showing how Congress
has not abdicated its legislative responsibility).
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